R (Bano) v London Borough of Waltham Forest [2025] EWCA Civ 92

Court of Appeal 

7 February 2025 

The Court of Appeal has held that a council’s main housing duty automatically ended when an applicant refused the offer of private rented accommodation and did not use a section 202 review rather than a judicial review to challenge the council’s decision.

In May 2017, Ms Bano applied to the London Borough of Waltham Forest (“The Council”) for housing assistance under Part 7 of the Housing Act 1996. The Council accepted that it owed her a duty under section 193 of the Housing Act 1996 and provided her with temporary accommodation. In June 2020, the Council offered her private sector accommodation in Derby. Ms Bano, refused the offer and the Council considered that this refusal had ended its duty to her. Ms Bano did not seek to review the decision and remained in the temporary accommodation. In November 2022, the Council issued proceedings against Mrs Bano for possession of the temporary accommodation. In response to this, Ms Bano issued a judicial review claim, contending that the offer of accommodation had failed to comply with section 193 of the Housing Act 1996 and therefore the Council still owed her a duty. Whilst the Council accepted that its offer had been defective, in that it had not mentioned the effect of section.195A (“Re-application after private rented sector offer”) as a consequence of accepting the offer, it argued that Ms Bano had other remedies to judicial review, such as applying for a review of the decision under section.202 of the Housing Act 1996, but had not exercised those rights.    

The High Court, in allowing the claim, held that section 202 of the Housing Act 1996 was only available where the Council had decided that the section 193 duty had ended – but neither in the offer letter nor subsequently had it made a decision that its duty had ended. It should have made a separate decision about whether its duty had ended. The Council appealed.   

The Court of Appeal, in allowing the appeal, held section 193 of the Housing Act 1996 does not require a separate decision or a notification that a Council’s duty has ended in the case of a private rented sector offer; rather, the duty ceased automatically on the refusal of the offer by Ms Bano.   

This decision will be welcomed by councils and local housing authorities, as it confirms that in these circumstances the housing duty ends automatically on refusal of a private rented sector offer.

A copy of the judgment is here. 

R. (on the application of Simpson) v Brentwood BC [2025] EWHC 462 (Admin) 

High Court 

5 March 2025 

The High Court has held that a housing applicant’s claim for judicial review against a council’s decision was unmerited and had no realistic prospect of success.   

Ms Simpson, a severely disabled woman with complex medical needs, was receiving palliative care and Continuing Health Care from the NHS funded by direct payments under a Personal Health Budget. Adult Social Care provided a Housing Needs Report as her accommodation was becoming unsuitable on account of her medical conditions. The report identified Ms Simpson as needing to be rehoused on an urgent basis into an adapted property. On 28 August 2021, Ms Simpson applied to Brentwood Borough Council (“The Council”) for a transfer. The application was supported by an Occupational Therapist report that recommended that (a) Ms Simpson be rehoused in a two bedroom fully accessible ground floor flat or bungalow and (b) that bathroom adaptations would need to be considered once she had been rehoused. Ms Simpson applied for an allocation of social housing under Part VI of the Housing Act 1996.  

On receiving the application, the Council considered Ms Simpson was homeless for the purposes of s.175 of the Housing Act 1996 and made her an offer of suitable temporary accommodation under Part VII of the Housing Act 1996. However, Ms Simpson contended that the Council had not lawfully allocated suitable adapted accommodation in accordance with its allocation scheme on awarding discretionary priority and adapted accommodation, and thus it was in breach of statutory duty. Ms Simpson sought to challenge the decision by way of a judicial review, arguing that the Council had failed to comply with its own allocation scheme under Part VI of the Housing Act 1996. 

The High Court, in refusing permission for judicial review, held that the claim was unmerited. Upon receipt of the application for re-housing, the authority had reason to believe that Ms Simpson was homeless. This had therefore activated the Part VII process, which it had followed correctly. 

A copy of the judgment is here. 

Singh Soor v Luton Borough Council [2025] UKFTT 259 (GRC) 

First-tier Tribunal(General Regulatory Chamber) 

27 February 2025  

The First-tier Tribunal has dismissed a professional landlord's appeal against penalty notices issued by a council in respect of multiple rental properties that did not have valid energy performance certificates. 

On 30 November 2022, Luton Borough Council (“The Council”) become aware that Mr Soor, the title holder of 19 rental properties in Luton, had not uploaded energy performance certificates (“EPCs”) to the Government's energy certificate portal and, consequently, served on him a Compliance Notice requiring him to produce relevant documentation. When it received no response, the Council issued a warning letter to Mr Soor advising him that failure to respond by 7 February 2023 would result in service of a Notice of Intention to issue a Financial Penalty in accordance with the Energy Efficiency (Private Rented Property) (England & Wales) Regulations 2015.. 

When no response was received, a Notice of Intention to issue a Financial Penalty was issued. Having received no response to the Notice, Financial Penalty Notices to the sum of £500 per property (a total of £9,500) were issued. On or around 17 April 2023, valid EPCs in respect of all the properties were delivered. Following a meeting with Mr Soor, at which Mr Soor apologised for his failure to comply with his obligations and put forward certain points in mitigation, the Council sent a notice to Mr Soor confirming its decision to impose a financial penalty but applying a one-third discount on account of the mitigatory factors that he had raised. The final penalty was reduced to £6,336.50. Mr Soor appealed, arguing that the absence of any prior history of infringement of statutory obligations and the personal mitigatory factors advanced by him, the revised penalty imposed was still excessive.  

The First-tier Tribunal, in dismissing the appeal, held that the reduced penalties were appropriate and lawful (and that the Council had in fact been generous in reducing the penalty by such a large amount). 

A copy of the judgment is here.