Our monthly Housing Case Law brings you a roundup of the latest cases and court decisions in one practical update.

Kyle v Coventry City Council [2023] EWCA Civ 1360

Court of Appeal, 20 November 2023

The Court of Appeal has held that a council had been entitled to find that a person whose anti-social conduct had led to his eviction from temporary accommodation had become intentionally homeless, despite the fact that it was not reasonable for him to stay there in the long term.

Coventry City Council (The Council) provided Mr Kyle, a housing applicant and recovering drug addict, with emergency temporary accommodation in multi-occupation housing that specialised in supporting recovering addicts, pursuant to its duty under section 188 of the Housing Act 1996. The Council informed Mr Kyle that its housing duty would be discharged if he was evicted from the property because of anti-social behaviour, smoking at the property or having visitors.

At a later date, the Council told Mr Kyle that it owed him the full housing duty under section 193 of the Housing Act 1996, and that the emergency accommodation would become his section 193 accommodation. When the accommodation provider subsequently asked the Council to evict Mr Kyle after he had broken into and stolen from other rooms in the accommodation, the Council told Mr Kyle that, as a result of his actions, he had become intentionally homeless and its section 193 duty had ended.

After Mr Kyle requested a review of the decision, the reviewing officer upheld the Council's original decision.

Mr Kyle appealed to the County Court, but the appeal was dismissed. The County Court held that the accommodation did not constitute a dwelling and so did not attract protection under the Protection from Eviction Act 1977.

Mr Kyle appealed to the Court of Appeal, arguing that

1. he could not have occupied the property indefinitely
2. the property's “no visitors” and “no smoking” rules had made it unreasonable for him to continue to occupy it
3. he was still homeless and therefore could not be intentionally homeless through eviction.

The Court of Appeal, in dismissing the appeal, held that accommodation can be reasonable to occupy under section 177 of the Housing Act 1996, even if a person is not able to stay there indefinitely or for a set period of time. The accommodation's “no visitors” and “no smoking” policies did not render it unreasonable to continue to occupy under section 177. The Council had therefore been entitled to conclude that it was reasonable for Mr Kyle to continue to occupy the room and that he had only lost his accommodation because of his own actions (i.e. stealing from other rooms). The Council had therefore been entitled to find that he had become intentionally homeless.

The decision clarifies how accommodation provided under the main housing duty may (or, conversely may not) constitute accommodation that is reasonable to occupy for the purposes of a decision on intentionality of homelessness. Accommodation can be reasonable to occupy even if at some point it may become unreasonable to occupy in the future.

A copy of the judgment is here.

Hussain v Newham LBC [2023] UKUT 287 (LC)

Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber), 6 December 2023

The Upper Tribunal has held that when making a banning order to prohibit a person from letting property or managing tenanted property, the First-tier Tribunal was entitled to take account of spent convictions when considering whether to make the order.

In October 2021, Mr Hussain had been found guilty under the Housing Act 2004 of several offences, including managing or being in control of a house in multiple occupation without a licence. The offences were all committed in 2018.

In March 2022, the London Borough of Newham (The Council) served Mr Hussain with a notice of intention to seek a banning order, pursuant to section 15 of the Housing and Planning Act 2016.

In May 2022, the Council applied to the First-tier Tribunal for a banning order. Mr Hussain’s previous convictions became spent on 30 September 2022, pursuant to the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974. In November 2022, the First-tier Tribunal made the banning order, which prohibited Mr Hussain from letting property or managing tenanted property for three years.

Mr Hussain resisted the banning order on the basis that the convictions were from 2018 and were therefore “spent” and that the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 prohibited them from being taken into account.

The First-tier Tribunal dismissed Mr Hussain’s argument. He appealed to the Upper Tribunal.

The Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber), in dismissing the appeal, held that due to the seriousness of the offences committed by Mr Hussein, the First-tier Tribunal had been entitled to admit evidence of spent convictions, and to take them into account when considering whether to make the banning order. It held that the phrase “has been convicted of a banning order offence” in sections 15 and 16 of the Housing and Planning Act 2016 should not be construed as only covering convictions that were not spent.

A copy of the judgment is here.

Bedi v Information Commissioner [2023] UKFTT 986 (GRC)

First-tier Tribunal (General Regulatory Chamber), 28 November 2023

The First-tier Tribunal has held that a local authority did not have to provide the addresses of its tenants following a freedom of information request.

Mr Bedi and his wife were tenants of London Borough of Hounslow (The Council). In October 2014 they began proceedings against the Council in the County Court for disrepair under section 11 of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985.

Whilst the works were carried out, the couple were provided with temporary accommodation by the Council, but this was approximately 10 miles away from their home. The couple argued that they should have been offered accommodation closer to their own home and wanted to launch a complaint against the Council.

Under the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act 2000, Mr Bedi requested the addresses of all ground floor flats located within a specified area that the Council had let between 8 March 2017 and 9 April 2021 and for how long they had been vacant during this time. The Council refused the request, as providing this information could lead to the tenants at these addresses being identified, and to disclose their personal data would be unlawful. The Council, instead, provided details of the number of ground floor flats that it had let in each street within the specified area during the specified period of time. Mr Bedi appealed, arguing that the information sought was not personal information and that his use of the information as evidence in court would not constitute disclosure “to the world at large”.

The First-tier Tribunal (General Regulatory Chamber), in dismissing the appeal, held that there was no lawful basis for the disclosure of the requested information through a freedom of information request. Councils were not generally permitted to disclose the personal data of third parties which could lead to their identification, and the Tribunal was satisfied that a request for addresses was a request for personal data.

A copy of the judgment is here.

Wolverhampton City Council and others v London Gypsies and Travellers and others [2023] UKSC 47

Supreme Court, 29 November 2023

The Supreme Court has held that courts have the power to grant final injunctions against persons unknown to prevent them from forming unauthorised encampments on local authority land at the time of the application and also in the future.

Between 2015 and 2020, 38 local authorities had obtained injunctions to prevent gypsies and modern-day travellers from encamping on their land without permission. These injunctions were obtained against “persons unknown”, as in most cases local authorities do not know the exact identity of the people who had previously encamped without permission. Subsequently, some of the local authorities sought to extend or vary the injunctions, as they were nearing their end, including seeking final injunctions.

The High Court determined that interim injunctions could be granted against persons unknown, but that final injunctions could be granted only against parties who had been identified (by description if necessary, if not by name) and had been given the opportunity to contest the final injunction sought. The local authorities appealed and the Court of Appeal held that the injunctions could be validly granted by the High Court both on an interim and final basis. This decision was subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court by the gypsy and traveller groups.

The Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeal's decision that final injunctions could be granted, but for significantly different reasons. It held that courts could grant injunctions against persons unknown on both an interim and final basis, but appropriate protections should be in place to ensure that the injunctions do not unduly interfere with the rights of “persons unknown”, as they would not necessarily have an opportunity to make representations to the court. The ability to respond flexibly to different factual scenarios was important for equality.

“Newcomer injunctions” were sometimes necessary to prevent gypsy and traveller communities from encamping before they had even attempted to do so. This was because if an injunction could only be sought after the event, these communities may move on and be replaced by other people who were not the subject of the legal action. The injunctions would therefore help to prevent continual replications of the same legal proceedings against new gypsy and traveller trespassers. That said, the Supreme Court was also mindful that protections were required – for example, it was reasonable to try and ensure that “persons unknown” were aware of the legal proceedings, so they had a fair opportunity to make representations.

This decision to allow final injunctions against “persons unknown” will be welcomed by local authorities and will assist them in protecting sites within their local area. It also clarifies the basis on which “newcomer injunctions” have been recognised.

A copy of the judgment is here.