Rowe v London Borough of Haringey [2022] EWCA Civ 1370

Court of Appeal, 21 October 2022

The Court of Appeal has held that the provisions of the Housing Act 1985 that cover the overcrowding of dwellings did not apply to a house in multiple occupation as a whole.

The appellant (“Ms Rowe”) lived with her two young children in a house in multiple occupation (HMO). The family had exclusive use of one bedroom and shared a communal kitchen and bathroom with four other adults. 

As she deemed the accommodation to be overcrowded, Ms Rowe applied to London Borough of Haringey for housing assistance as a homeless person under the Housing Act 1996. However, London Borough of Haringey determined that she was not homeless and that she was not living in overcrowded accommodation within the meaning of Part X of the Housing Act 1985.

Ms Rowe appealed unsuccessfully to the County Court.

Ms Rowe appealed to the Court of Appeal, contending that the County Court had erred in concluding that her bedroom, rather than the whole HMO, was the relevant “dwelling” for the purposes of the room and space standards under Part X of the Housing Act 1985.

The Court of Appeal, in dismissing the appeal, held that it was not Parliament's intention that Part X of the Housing Act 1985 should apply to the whole HMO. Part X applied to a dwelling, which was defined as any premises “used or suitable for use as a separate dwelling”. Ms Rowe did not use the whole of the HMO as a separate dwelling and there was no basis for inferring that the HMO in its present condition would, if empty, be suitable for use as a separate dwelling.

The ruling will be welcomed by local housing authorities, as it provides helpful clarification on the application of Part X of the Housing Act 1985 to HMOs.

A copy of the judgment is here.

Norton v London Borough of Haringey [2022] EWCA Civ 1340

Court of Appeal, 19 October 2022

The Court of Appeal has held that a local housing authority had failed to comply with the statutory requirements of the Housing Act 1996 when making a private sector rented offer.

London Borough of Haringey had provided the appellant (“Mr Norton”) with temporary homeless accommodation under a non-secure licence under the Housing Act 1996. Subsequently, London Borough of Haringey made a written private sector rented offer (PRSO) of accommodation to Mr Norton (a 24-month assured shorthold tenancy of a private sector flat), which would bring to an end its duty to house him under section 193 of the Housing Act 1996. The offer letter did not specify a start date, but stated that the property was deemed suitable and had been subject to an inspection. Reference was also made to Mr Norton’s right to re-apply for accommodation within two years, if he became homeless again through no fault of his own.

Mr Norton accepted the offer but sought reviews of London Borough of Haringey’s decision to discharge the duty by way of the PRSO and of the suitability of the accommodation. Following a review, London Borough of Haringey concluded that the necessary statutory conditions had been met by the PRSO.

The County Court rejected Mr Norton’s appeal. He appealed to the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal, in allowing the appeal, held that in its letter to Mr Norton, London Borough of Haringey had made no reference to the effect of section 195A(2) of the Housing Act 1996. This covers the making a further application for housing assistance within two years of accepting a PRSO. The letter had failed to comply with the requirements of s.193(7F) of the Housing Act 1996 and therefore could not have operated to discharge the section 193 duty. There was also no evidence to confirm that the requirements of article 3 of the Homelessness (Suitability of Accommodation) (England) Order 2012 regarding the suitability of the accommodation offered had been met before the PRSO was made.

This decision highlights the importance of local housing authorities complying with all of their statutory obligations when making a PRSO, in order to ensure that they have effectively discharged their duty under section 193 of the Housing Act 1996. It would be prudent for local housing authorities to review their existing PRSO policies and procedures, including their template letters.

A copy of the judgment is here.

R. (on the application of YR) v Lambeth LBC [2022] EWHC 2813 (Admin)

High Court, 8 November 2022

The High Court allowed a judicial review application to challenge a local authority’s discharge of its housing duty functions.

The claimant (“YR”), a single mother of seven children, applied to London Borough of Lambeth for assistance under Part 7 of the Housing Act 1996.

Following an assessment of her housing needs, London Borough of Lambeth offered YR a four-bedroom property in Essex; however, YR contended that the property was unsuitable as it was too far away from her support network and would disrupt her children’s schooling. Fearing that London Borough of Lambeth would not offer her further accommodation if she refused the property, YR accepted the property, but issued judicial review proceedings, contending that London Borough of Lambeth’s housing needs assessment under section 189A of the Housing Act 1996 was unlawful and that the property in Essex was unsuitable.

The High Court, in allowing the application, held that the section 189A assessment had made no reference to the needs of YR’s children and the impact that the move would have on their education. Also, London Borough of Lambeth had not taken any steps to determine whether there were school places available for the children in Essex. These lapses meant that the assessment was unlawful and, therefore, meant that the property in Essex was unsuitable. The Court also found that London Borough of Lambeth had not correctly applied its own placements policy on out-of-borough accommodation. This policy stated that households with a child in Year 11 had priority to accommodation within the Lambeth 'local area'.

This decision highlights the importance of local housing authorities in ensuring that they comply with their statutory duties and that they follow their own policies.

A copy of the judgment is here.

Lambeth LBC v Kelly and others [2022] UKUT 290 (LC)

Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber), 17 November 2022

The Upper Tribunal has held that the First-tier Tribunal had jurisdiction to grant a landlord dispensation from the consultation requirements under the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985, where it had already determined the service charge payable by one of the leaseholders.

London Borough of Lambeth carried out works to a block of flats that it owned, which triggered the consultation requirements under section 20 of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985.

One of the respondents (“Mrs Danvers-Russell”) claimed that she had not received a section 20 notice, as it had been sent to her flat – she did not occupy the flat and said that London Borough of Lambeth knew this and also had her correct contact address that it had used for several years. The works were completed before the section 20 notice was served and Mrs Danvers-Russell did not receive a copy of that notice until nearly two years afterwards.

Mrs Danvers-Russell’s applied to the First-tier Tribunal for a determination that, due to London Borough of Lambeth’s failure to comply with the consultation requirements, her contribution to the costs of the work should be limited to the statutory cap of £250. The First-tier Tribunal agreed.

London Borough of Lambeth applied to the First-tier Tribunal for dispensation from the consultation requirements, but this was refused. The Upper Tribunal granted London Borough of Lambeth limited permission to appeal the ruling.

The Upper Tribunal, in allowing the appeal, held that the First-tier Tribunal had been wrong to find that it had no jurisdiction to determine a dispensation application once a section 27A determination had been made. It found that although section 20 of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 imposes a cap on leaseholders' contributions where a landlord has failed to consult, the First-tier Tribunal is able to lift or modify that cap on a dispensation application under section 20ZA. It granted London Borough of Lambeth’s dispensation under section 20ZA. Whilst London Borough of Lambeth had failed in its statutory duty to consult the leaseholders, not only because it failed to serve the notice at the correct address but also because the notice was served after the works had been completed and an invoice issued, Mrs Danvers-Russell had not demonstrated any actual loss or suffered relevant prejudice to make dispensation unreasonable.

A copy of the judgment is here.