R (Campbell) v London Borough of Ealing [2024] EWCA Civ 540

Court of Appeal, 17 May 2024

The Court of Appeal has confirmed that there is no duty or power for a local authority to offer or fund housing accommodation under the Care Act 2014 if it could be provided under the Housing Act 1996.

The claimant (Mr Campbell) suffered from Retinitis Pigmentosa and was partially sighted. He suffered from obsessive compulsive disorder and depression, and had a need for care and support under the Care Act 2014, which requires the provision of accommodation for its effective delivery. The London Borough of Ealing periodically assessed Mr Campbell’s care and support needs, and found that these included managing and maintaining nutrition, maintaining personal hygiene, being appropriately clothed, being able to use his home safely and maintaining a habitable home environment. These needs were being met by Mr Campbell’s partner and family and, for this reason, he declined the provision of managed care or direct payments by the London Borough of Ealing.

Mr Campbell had been living in temporary accommodation, but considered that the accommodation, which was funded by the London Borough of Ealing, was unsuitable to meet his housing needs. Subsequently, the London Borough of Ealing said that it would be withdrawing its funding for his accommodation on the basis that he had rejected a number of permanent properties that it had offered. The London Borough of Ealing argued that it did not owe Mr Campbell a duty to provide accommodation under the Care Act 2014 because his need was for housing under the Housing Act 1996, rather than care and support (which was being provided by his partner and family).

Mr Campbell applied for judicial review of the decision.

The High Court, in refusing the application, held that the London Borough of Ealing had not acted unlawfully as it

1. had no power or duty under the Care Act 2014 to meet Mr Campbell’s care and support needs by providing, or funding, accommodation under the Act
2. had no ongoing duty under the Act to provide him with, or to fund, his accommodation. The resolution of Mr Campbell’s housing issue needed to be addressed under the Housing Act 1996. Mr Campbell appealed.

The Court of Appeal, in dismissing the appeal, noted that section 23 of the Care Act 2014 expressly prevents a local authority from doing under the Care Act 2014 anything which it is required to do under the Housing Act 1996. Therefore, if a local authority is already required under the Housing Act 1996 to rehouse an individual, it is not required to do so under the Care Act 2014 and must instead apply its housing priority scheme.

This ruling provides welcome clarity for local authorities when considering housing needs in the light of an applicant’s illness or disability. It is clear that section 23 of the Care Act 2014 prevents local authorities from meeting care and support needs by providing housing under the Care Act 2014, if they are already required to do so under the Housing Act 1996.

A copy of the judgment is here.

Newcastle City Council v Abdallah [2024] UKUT 140 (LC)

Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber), 21 May 2024

The Upper Tribunal has held that a landlord breached the terms of his licence when he failed to provide information in response to a request sent to him by post, but which he did not receive as it was a wrong address.

Mr Abdallah was a landlord under a selective licensing scheme operated by Newcastle City Council (The Council) under the Housing Act 2004. When Mr Abdallah moved house in 2017, he failed to notify the Council’s licensing department, which breached a condition of his licence. In 2018, he gave his new address to the Council’s tax department, but this was not shared with the Council’s licensing department.

In 2021, the Council’s licensing department wrote to Mr Abdallah at his old address (which was no longer occupied) to request some information from him. The letter was sent by ordinary post and, thus, Mr Abdullah did not receive the letter, nor the subsequent warning letter which informed him that enforcement action might be taken if he failed to provide the required information. The licensing department subsequently obtained the new address from the tax department and issued Mr Abdallah with a financial penalty notice, claiming he had breached the terms of his licence by failing to provide the requested information. Mr Abdallah provided the information but appealed the imposition of the penalty notice.

The First-tier Tribunal (Property Chamber) allowed Mr Abdallah’s appeal, finding that, under section 233 of the Local Government Act 1972, the Council had not sent its demand for information to Mr Abdullah’s last known address and so he was not required to comply with the demand. The Council appealed.

The Upper Tribunal, in allowing the appeal, held that that the First-tier Tribunal (Property Chamber) had erred in finding that Mr Abdallah had not been properly served under section 233 of the Local Government Act 1972. The notice of intent to impose a financial penalty had been served at the last known address that the Council had for Mr Abdallah. The Council’s tax department's knowledge of his address was "not to be imputed" to the licensing team, which was not required to look beyond the address on Mr Abdallah’s licence application and the licence. The Council was therefore entitled to assume that Mr Abdallah lived at his former address.

A copy of the judgment is here.

YI v Hobbs [2024] UKUT 155 (LC)

Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber), 3 June 2024

The Upper Tribunal has handed down a ruling concerning rent repayment orders and the treatment of rent arrears.

Ms Yi let a five-bedroom house that was required to be licensed under Part 2 of the Housing Act 2004, but which was not. Ms Yi had entered into tenancy agreements with the three occupiers of the rooms in the house and the occupiers' rent was paid to her. The occupiers lived in the property at a time when it should have been licensed as a house in multiple occupation (HMO). The three occupiers applied to the First-tier Tribunal (Property Chamber) for rent repayment orders on the basis that Ms Yi had committed the offence of managing or controlling the property when it should have been licensed and was not. It was not in dispute that the property should have been licensed at all times during the applicants' occupation. The only issue between Ms Yi and the occupiers was the amount to be paid. The First-tier Tribunal (Property Chamber) handed down a decision that neither party supported –

1. the occupiers contended that the Tribunal had been wrong to take into account their rent arrears when calculating the rent repayment orders
2. Ms Yi contended that the decision contained various arithmetical errors.

The Upper Tribunal, in allowing the appeal, held that

1. the occupiers were wrong to say that rent arrears should not be taken into account
2. Ms Yi had correctly identified various arithmetical errors made by the First-tier Tribunal (Property Chamber) which needed to be corrected.

The Upper Tribunal substituted its own decision, taking into account the rent arrears and correcting the arithmetical errors identified in the deduction for utilities, and made the rent repayment orders.

A copy of the judgment is here.

In Enfield London Borough v Snell [2024] EWHC 1206 (KB)

High Court, 21 May 2024

A Council successfully applied for an injunction against boat owners in order to prevent trespass disrupting its development work.

The London Borough of Enfield (The Council) owned some land adjoining a river and was beginning construction works on a project to develop 10,000 new homes. The various defendants lived on boats along the river and moored their boats by using the Council’s land.

The Council, sought an injunction, claiming that the mooring amounted to a trespass and argued that the defendants’ presence was disrupting, and would continue to disrupt, the progress of the construction works. Any delays to the project could lead to significant financial consequences for the Council.

The Court, in granting the injunction, held that although the boats were occupied as homes, any interference with the defendants’ rights under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (the right to respect for private and family life, and home) by granting the injunction was justified and not disproportionate. The Council was entitled to exercise its rights as the land owner. It had not consented to the moorings and the defendants were therefore trespassers. Alternative moorings had been identified and the Council was going to support the process.

A copy of the judgment is here.

Ipswich Borough Council v TD [2024] UKUT 117 (AAC)

Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber), 11 April 2024

The Upper Tribunal has held that a person was not entitled to be “passported” to the maximum housing benefit during the period that she had a ‘nil award’ of Universal Credit.

The respondent (TD) and her partner claimed Universal Credit. When they became homeless, Ipswich Borough Council (The Council) provided them with temporary accommodation in a homeless families unit. This meant that TD had to apply for housing benefit in order to meet her rental housing costs while in the temporary accommodation, despite already receiving Universal Credit. TD was awarded the maximum housing benefit and, as a consequence, the Universal Credit payments were reduced to nil.

The Council considered that the nil payments meant that TD was no longer 'on Universal Credit' for the periods when she had what the Department for Work and Pensions described as nil or £0.00 'awards' of Universal Credit, and so therefore TD had been overpaid housing benefit during those periods.

The First-tier Tribunal dismissed the Council’s argument, finding that there had been no overpayment of housing benefit to TD during those periods. The Council appealed.

The Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber), in allowing the appeal, held that a person was “on Universal Credit” if they were entitled to receive Universal Credit. Under the law, there could not be a nil award of, or nil entitlement to, Universal Credit. On that basis, TD was not “on Universal Credit” for the purposes of the Housing Benefit Regulations 2006 during the period in which TD had received nil or £0.00 ‘awards’ of Universal Credit, and she could not be “passported” to a full award of housing benefit for the period when she had a nil award of Universal Credit.

A copy of the judgment is here.